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Hollywood’s Raid on Entebbe: Behind the Scenes of the United States-Israel 
Alliance 
 
One by one, the camera settles on their frightened faces. At first, the hostages 
in the cramped, humid airport terminal thought it was just another announcement, 
something to relieve their boredom almost. But as the hijackers’ body language 
changes and the movie’s mournful soundtrack builds, it quickly dawns both on the 
hostages (and the audience) just what’s happening: Thirty years after the Second 
World War, and in the middle of Africa, the Jews are being selected, just like during 
the Holocaust. “Schnell! Move to the right!” barks the steely-eyed German hijacker, 
as she calls out the Jewish names through the loudspeaker. When Moshe Meir, a 
terrified old Belgian gentleman, protests he’s not Israeli, a Palestinian hijacker 
viciously knocks him to the ground then pushes him to the right. The non-Jewish 
hostages look on with a mixture of horror, relief and shame. After the selection is 
complete, the Jews are marched into a separate room. The door is closed—as if 
imprisoning them (and the audience) in the gas chambers—and the screen goes to 
black.1 
                                                           
1 Victory at Entebbe (Marvin J. Chomsky, ABC Television, 1976). 
2 On the role of Jews in Hollywood, including their depiction on the American big 
screen, see Neal Gabler, An Empire of Their Own (New York, 1988); Patricia Erens, 
The Jew in American Cinema (Bloomington, IN, 1988); Lester D. Friedman, 
Hollywood's Image of the Jew (New York, 1982); Omar Bartov, The “Jew” in 
Cinema: From The Golem to Don’t Touch My Holocaust (Bloomington, IN, 2005), 
204–23; Thomas Doherty, Hollywood and Hitler (New York, 2013). On Exodus see 
Michele Mart, Eye on Israel (New York, 2006); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: 
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Hollywood’s alleged “special relationship” with the State of Israel has been 
the subject of intense media comment for many years now. To date, most scholars 
have approached the Hollywood-Israel connection obliquely, that is by centering 
either on the conspicuous role of Jews in the American film industry, on the 
representation of Israel’s founding in movies such as Exodus (1960), or on 
Hollywood’s portrayals of Middle Eastern terrorism over the past three decades.2 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945 (Berkeley, CA, 
2005); M. M. Silver, Our Exodus: Leon Uris and the Americanization of Israel’s 
Founding Story (Detroit, MI, 2010). On Hollywood’s portrayals of Middle Eastern 
terrorism since the 1980s see Lina Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East: Politics 
in the Cinemas of Hollywood and the Arab World (London, 2006); Stephen Prince, 
Firestorm: American Film in the Age of Terrorism (New York, 2009); Helena 
Vanhala, The Depiction of Terrorists in Hollywood Blockbuster Films, 1980–2001: 
An Analytical Study (Jefferson, NC, 2010); Carl Boggs and Tom Pollard, “Hollywood 
and the Spectacle of Terrorism,” New Political Science 28, no. 3 (2006): 335–51. 
2 On the role of Jews in Hollywood, including their depiction on the American big 
screen, see Neal Gabler, An Empire of Their Own (New York, 1988); Patricia Erens, 
The Jew in American Cinema (Bloomington, IN, 1988); Lester D. Friedman, 
Hollywood's Image of the Jew (New York, 1982); Omar Bartov, The “Jew” in 
Cinema: From The Golem to Don’t Touch My Holocaust (Bloomington, IN, 2005), 
204–23; Thomas Doherty, Hollywood and Hitler (New York, 2013). On Exodus see 
Michele Mart, Eye on Israel (New York, 2006); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: 
Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945 (Berkeley, CA, 
2005); M. M. Silver, Our Exodus: Leon Uris and the Americanization of Israel’s 
Founding Story (Detroit, MI, 2010). On Hollywood’s portrayals of Middle Eastern 
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Building on recent scholarship that has turned “the lens on film and foreign relations,” 
this article interweaves diplomatic and media history to look directly at the 
Hollywood-Israel relationship.3 It does so, moreover, by uniquely taking into account 
the dynamics of that relationship on, behind, and away from the screen. In the 
process, the article shines important light on the popular cultural dimensions of the 
U.S.-Israeli alliance; contributes to recent scholarship on the history of Israeli public 
diplomacy; and both historicizes and widens the debate about the role that America’s 
pro-Israel community has played in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East.4  
                                                                                                                                                                      
terrorism since the 1980s see Lina Khatib, Filming the Modern Middle East: Politics 
in the Cinemas of Hollywood and the Arab World (London, 2006); Stephen Prince, 
Firestorm: American Film in the Age of Terrorism (New York, 2009); Helena 
Vanhala, The Depiction of Terrorists in Hollywood Blockbuster Films, 1980–2001: 
An Analytical Study (Jefferson, NC, 2010); Carl Boggs and Tom Pollard, “Hollywood 
and the Spectacle of Terrorism,” New Political Science 28, no. 3 (2006): 335–51. 
3 For a brief but excellent summary of the different ways in which scholars have 
brought together the perspectives of film and international history over the last decade 
in particular see Laura A. Belmonte, “Introduction: Turning the Lens on Film and 
Foreign Affairs,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 5 (2012): 785–87. 
4 For analysis of the broader cultural affinity between the United States and Israel, and 
of the role played in the U.S.-Israeli alliance by “elite” politico-cultural actors such as 
American journalists, see Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American 
Political Culture (Cambridge, MA, 2015); J. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the 
American Jewish Establishment (Reading, MA, 1996); Marda Dunsky, Pens and 
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The article concentrates on the relationship between Hollywood and Israel 
during the 1970s. Its focus is on the three films—two American, one Israeli—that 
speedily recreated the famous Israeli Entebbe raid of July 4th, 1976. How and why the 
Israeli military’s dramatic counter-terrorist operation at Entebbe in Uganda captured 
the attention of the world’s politicians and news media is well understood.5 Less well 
known is the contest that the operation triggered among filmmakers in the United 
States and Israel to be the first to re-enact it on screen. Drawing on American and 
Israeli archival sources, the article reveals how more than a dozen film companies 
competed with one another to be the first to cash in on Israel’s raid, and shows how 
the Israeli government effectively held an auction among filmmakers as part of a 
long-running public diplomacy strategy targeting Hollywood. The article examines in 
detail how the three movies made about Entebbe in 1976–1977 came about, and how 
each of them—as exemplified by the scene from ABC Television’s Victory at 
Entebbe outlined above—painted the Entebbe crisis in primary political colors. It 
considers the three movies’ distribution and reception, and shows how both pro-
Zionists and anti-Zionists used the films for propaganda purposes. Finally, the article 
assesses the three movies’ cultural, political, and diplomatic legacy.  
Analysis below demonstrates that Hollywood and Israel enjoyed an 
extraordinarily close relationship in the 1970s, one that reflected, projected, and 
underpinned the alliance that existed between the U.S. and Israeli governments. At the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Swords: How the Mainstream American Media Report the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
(New York, 2008). 
5 Saul David, Operation Thunderbolt (London, 2016); Simon Dunstan, Israel’s 
Lightning Strike—The Raid on Entebbe 1976 (London, 2009); Max Hastings, Yoni—
Hero of Entebbe (New York, 1979); McAlister, Epic Encounters, 184–87. 
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same time, it explains how that relationship had limits. On the one hand, in late 1976 
the Israeli government fell afoul of Hollywood’s commercial instincts and in the 
process failed to conjure the Entebbe blockbuster it craved. On the other hand, the 
filmic “race” for Entebbe strengthened the Hollywood-Israel relationship and helped 
lay the foundations for the American film industry’s powerful depiction of Arabs as 
international terrorists in the decades ahead. In doing so, Hollywood’s “Entebbe 
episode” points to the importance of investigating the role of popular culture and 
propaganda in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the value of exploring the hidden 
complexities of America’s pro-Israel community. 
Historians and political scientists have long been interested in Israel advocacy 
in the United States. This largely reflects animated polemics concerning American 
policies in the Middle East and the image of Israel in American public discourse.6 
Political scientists John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt generated the most 
recent public and academic controversy in 2006-2007,  when they contended that an 
"Israel Lobby" with undue domestic power had managed to sway American policy in 
                                                           
6 M. S. El Azhary, Political Cohesion of American Jews in American Politics: A 
Reappraisal of Their Role in Presidential Elections (Washington, DC, 1980); Dan 
Fleshler, Transforming America’s Israel Lobby (Washington, DC, 2009); David 
Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and 
Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel (Westport, CT, 1990); Nancy Jo Nelson, “The 
Zionist Organizational Structure, ” Journal of Palestine Studies 10, no. 1 (1980): 80–
93; James Petras, The Power of Israel in the United States (Atlanta, GA, 2006); 
Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy 
(New York, 1987); Dov Waxman, Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish 
Conflict over Israel (Princeton, NJ, 2016). 
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the Middle East in the Jewish state’s favor, to the detriment of U.S. national interests.7 
In their book-length study, Mearsheimer and Walt claimed that far from simply 
lobbying leaders and politicians, the so-called Israel Lobby has generated American 
public support for Israel by dominating and pressuring the U.S. mainstream media, 
with the result that open debate about American policy regarding Israel is stifled. 
Significantly, in discussing the shaping (or censoring) of American public discourse 
about Israel they do not mention the role either of Hollywood or of Israeli public 
diplomacy—the subjects of this article.8 
 Over the decades, Hollywood has played an important role in Israel advocacy 
on and off the screen: both in projecting pro-Israeli themes and in lobbying the 
corridors of Washington power. Following the birth of Israel in 1948, numerous 
Hollywood producers and talent—mostly Jewish—sought to create feature films 
telling the story of Israel’s establishment and promise. The nascent Israeli government 
did its utmost to promote such pro-Zionist film projects for the sake of “hasbara” 
(literally: explanation), the common Hebrew term for propaganda and public 
diplomacy. Well aware of the power of Hollywood to make money and to mold 
popular opinion about past and present events, Israeli government officials attempted 
to lure big dollar-spending productions to Israel and especially to project a positive 
                                                           
7 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (New York, 2007). For a critique of their argument see Robert C. Lieberman, 
“The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 2 (2009): 
235–57. 
8 The only Hollywood "mogul" that Mearsheimer and Walt mention, Haim Saban, is 
discussed in relation to a political think-tank he finances. See Mearsheimer and Walt, 
The Israel Lobby, 176–77. 
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image of Israel’s founding and Israeli life. Most of these projects were thwarted due 
to the high costs of production in an entertainment industry operating according to 
exacting market forces. However, the eventual result of Hollywood affection and 
Israeli public diplomacy was Exodus—the book by Leon Uris (1958) and the film by 
Otto Preminger (1960)—which became a cultural "phenomenon" that shaped 
favorable international perceptions of Israel for a generation, especially in the United 
States.9 
 Hollywood Jewish magnates were also involved in direct political lobbying of 
Washington. In the 1950s, Barney Balaban, president of Paramount Pictures, helped 
set up what would soon become the leading pro-Israel lobbying organization in the 
United States, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).10 In the 1960s, 
Arthur Krim, president of United Artists, was a major Democratic Party fundraiser 
and a close confidant and personal friend of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Krim and 
his wife Mathilde (an Italian-born scientist who had smuggled guns for the pre-state 
                                                           
9 Giora Goodman, “‘Operation Exodus’: Israeli Government Involvement in the 
Production of Otto Preminger's Film Exodus (1960),” Journal of Israeli History 33, 
no. 2 (2014): 209–29. For a study of Israeli government hasbara in the decade before 
the Entebbe raid see Jonathan Cummings, Israel's Public Diplomacy: The Problems 
of Hasbara, 1966–1975 (Lanham, MD, 2016). 
10 I. L. Kenen, Israel’s Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington (Buffalo, 
NY, 1981), 69. Balaban was also involved with AIPAC’s forerunner, the American 
Zionist Council.  
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Zionist underground organization, Irgun) played an important part in the pro-Israel 
lobbying of President Johnson, including during the June 1967 war.11 
 For all the political and cultural power of Israel advocacy, the U.S. and Israeli 
governments often clashed. One serious falling-out came in March 1975, following 
the failure of President Gerald Ford’s administration to induce Israeli land 
concessions in the Sinai, despite intensive shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger. When the frustrated administration announced as a result that it was 
carrying out a "reassessment" of Middle East policy—in effect suspending annual 
talks of military aid to Israel—the American Jewish community immediately sprang 
into action. Lobbying by AIPAC resulted in a letter to Ford signed by no less than 
seventy-six senators and made public in the New York Times; the letter expressed 
support for Israel's insistence on "defensible" boundaries and urged the administration 
to be responsive to Israel's "urgent military and economic needs.”12 This sort of 
domestic political pressure naturally displeased the administration in private, and was 
publicly attacked by long-time critic Senator William J. Fulbright, who argued that 
the "extraordinary power" of the "Israeli lobby" to "mobilize large majorities in 
Congress" was to blame for hobbling "any efforts to achieve peace” in the Middle 
                                                           
11 Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle-East 
(New York, 2007), 116–19, 301–2, 347, 383; Memorandum from the President’s 
Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, June 7, 1967, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, doc. 195, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d195, last accessed May 
22, 2017. 
12 Bernard Gwertzman, “75 Senators Back Israel's Aid Bids,” New York Times, May 
22, 1975, 1.  
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East.13 Some prominent Jews also privately worried about uncritical American Jewish 
support for Israel. Lew Wasserman, owner of Universal Studios, and a man with 
strong political connections to both Republicans and Democrats, told Henry Kissinger 
that "the present course in Israel" could lead "to massive anti-Semitism here," adding 
that “the power of the institutional Jews must be broken." Wasserman was one of the 
most prolific donors to Israel in Hollywood.14 
 An important Sinai II disengagement agreement was finally achieved thanks to 
American diplomacy and pressure in September 1975, but when Israeli prime minister 
Yitzhak Rabin arrived for talks in early 1976, the mood in Washington was still 
skeptical: the American leadership was frustrated with Israel's stalling of further 
                                                           
13 Arlene Lazarowitz, “American Jewish Leaders and President Gerald R. Ford: 
Disagreement over the Middle East Reassessment Plan,” American Jewish History 98, 
no. 3 (2014), 195; Arlene Lazarowitz, “A Southern Senator and Israel: Senator 
William Fulbright's Accusations of Undue Influence over American Foreign Policy in 
the Middle East,” Southern Jewish History 14 (2011), 119–54.  
14 Memorandum of Conversation [between President Gerald Ford and Dr. Henry 
Kissinger], January 27, 1976, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 
XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, doc. 255, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d255, last accessed May 
22, 2017; Dennis Mcdougal, The Last Mogul: Lew Wasserman, MCA and the Hidden 
History of Hollywood (Boston, MA, 2001), 344, 402; Michael Aushenker, “Eulogies: 
Lew Wasserman”, Jewish Journal, June 6, 2002, 
http://jewishjournal.com/old_stories/6089/, last accessed May 22, 2017.  
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conflict-resolution negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians.15 After four 
days of Washington discussions—during which Rabin became the first Israeli leader 
to address a joint session of Congress (though not matching Egyptian president Anwar 
Sadat's full house a year earlier)—the Israeli premier left for a week-long tour of 
public engagements and fund-raising with Jewish communities across the United 
States.16 The pinnacle of Rabin’s tour was a Hollywood gala in his honor. The United 
States Information Service official news report boasted that the gala "included almery 
major motion picture star and entertainment executive in the industry, and was of the 
same magnitude as an Academy Awards presentation."17 Frank Sinatra hosted the 
event, with performances by John Denver and Diana Ross, who sang "Reach Out and 
Touch" with Rabin; an anonymous group of Hollywood executives paid for the gala 
and Ted Ashley, CEO of Warner Bros., chaired it. Henry Kissinger, whose own close 
friends in Hollywood included big Israel-supporters Kirk Douglas and Gregory Peck, 
joined Rabin as a special guest to help put aside some of the bad blood of the past 
year.18 . The Secretary of State's uncharacteristic reference to his Jewish roots and his 
warm and witty words concerning Israel went down very well with the Israeli 
                                                           
15 See record of the Washington talks in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, 900–19.  
16 Bernard Gwertzman. "Rabin Rules Out Any Negotiation With P.L.O. Heads", New 
York Times, January 29, 1976, 1. 
17 United States Information Service official news report, February 5, 1976, A/112/15, 
Israel Sate Archives (ISA). 
18 On Kissinger and Hollywood see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New 
York, 2005), 361–65. 
11 
 
media.19 Even more than Capitol Hill, Hollywood proved not only a bastion of 
support for Israel, but also the perfect place for a public display of unity. 
Hollywood, however, derived its power primarily from making dramatically 
successful films. And five months later, the Israeli military's triumphant mission at 
Entebbe contained, as one Hollywood critic later put it, just about everything an 
adventure movie producer could wish for: a mix of characters thrown together by fate, 
a plot that put an upbeat twist on the then fashionable airline disaster theme, and the 
sort of last-minute rescue seen in countless Hollywood westerns.20 One high-powered 
Hollywood executive, Universal Studios’ president Sidney Sheinberg, put it more 
succinctly: “The mission reads like a movie script.”21 
 The real-life drama that climaxed at Entebbe in early July 1976 had opened a 
week earlier in the skies above Europe. On June 27, 1976, members of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the German group Revolutionary Cells 
hijacked an Air France Airbus en route from Tel Aviv to Paris shortly after leaving 
Athens Airport. After diverting first to Libya, the plane landed at Entebbe Airport, 
near the Ugandan capital Kampala, on June 28. At Entebbe, the hijackers, who were 
supported by the forces of Ugandan president Idi Amin, transferred the passengers 
into an old airport terminal building. They then issued demands for the release of 40 
Palestinians held in Israel and threatened to start killing the hostages on July 1 if their 
                                                           
19 "1200 Hollywood Stars made a Tribute Night to Israel", Yediot Achronot, January 
4, 1976, 1; See also Maariv, January 4, 1976; Davar, January 5, 1976. 
20 J. T., “Operation Thunderbolt,” Independent Film Journal, January 20, 1978, 30.  
21 “Show Business. Entebbe Derby,” Time, July 26, 1976, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,914418,00.html, last accessed 
May 22, 2017. 
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demands were not met. Almost all of the non-Israeli hostages were then freed. When 
the July 1 deadline passed and negotiations broke down, the Israeli cabinet gave the 
go-ahead for a military rescue. On July 4, following a 2,500-mile flight from Israel, a 
100-strong Israeli special forces unit landed in darkness and stormed the old Entebbe 
Airport terminal building. In less than an hour, the unit killed all the hijackers and 
rescued all but four of the remaining 106 hostages. One Israeli soldier died, the unit’s 
leader Yonatan Netanyahu. One hostage, 74-year-old Dora Bloch, who had been 
taken to a hospital in Kampala before the rescue operation, was subsequently 
murdered by Idi Amin's security forces.22 
Coming in the wake of a series of bungled anti-terrorist operations (including 
at the Munich Olympics in 1972), many international commentators immediately saw 
the Israelis’ success at Entebbe as ground-breaking. Many Americans greeted Israel’s 
counter-terrorist strike so enthusiastically because the raid had coincided with the 
United States’ Bicentennial. As Melani McAlister has noted, neither U.S. public 
officials nor journalists were above making grandiose statements implying that the 
Israelis and the hijackers had orchestrated their crisis with the United States in mind. 
“The Israelis gave us a very special birthday present this July 4th,” one State 
Department official effused. President Ford congratulated the Israelis on their mission 
and later thanked Israel publicly for enhancing the Bicentennial celebrations through 
its feat of “bravery”: “That action of liberation freed our own hearts to fuller 
                                                           
22 David, Operation Thunderbolt; Ze'ev Drory, Dan Shomron: Subtle Leadership (Tel 
Aviv, 2016), 173–206. 
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understanding of the universal meaning of independence—and the courageous action 
sometimes required to preserve it.”23 
Hollywood's own “raid” on Entebbe started within hours of the Israeli raid. To 
a large extent this can be attributed to commercial exploitation of an incident that had 
dominated U.S. and international headlines. Yet Hollywood’s interest in Entebbe also 
reflected the close ties that had developed between the American film community and 
Israel since the 1940s. On the morning after the Entebbe raid, Warner Bros.’ boss Ted 
Ashley telephoned the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Simcha Dinitz, to 
congratulate him excitedly on the “wonderful operation.” Ashley proposed making a 
major movie about the “historic” event and suggested immediately sending several of 
Warner Bros.’ top filmmakers to meet Israeli ministers. Israeli government co-
operation would be essential to deter “cheap” versions by other studios, Ashley stated. 
The value of the “respectable” and “impressive” movie that Warner Bros. had in 
mind—which “of course” would partly be filmed in Israel, Ashley said—would be to 
assure “first rate public relations” for Israel on a par with “a new Exodus if not more 
than that.” In his report to the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 
Jerusalem, Dinitz described Ashley—born in Brooklyn as Theodore Assofsky—as a 
                                                           
23 McAlister, Epic Encounters, 183–84; Gerald Ford, "Remarks at the B'nai B'rith 
Biennial Convention, 1976," The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6317&st=entebbe&st1=, last 
accessed May 22, 2017. 
14 
 
“devoted” supporter of Israel, and asked that the government consider his 
suggestion.24  
Ashley was not the only Hollywood chief with close contacts with the Israeli 
establishment however. In the first week of July, Universal Studios' Lew Wasserman 
dispatched an urgent cable to Yitzhak Rabin and signaled his serious interest in an 
Entebbe project by sending two senior executives to Israel.25 Having started to 
develop a story about Entebbe before the crisis had even concluded, Universal was 
not surprisingly the first major Hollywood company to announce that it was going to 
make a film about the raid. George Roy Hill, who had won an Academy Award for 
The Sting in 1974, had agreed to direct, and Paul Newman, the star of Otto 
Preminger’s Exodus back in 1960, had, according to Universal's pitch to the Israeli 
government, expressed “unsolicited interest” in their project.26 
Determined not to be outdone, on July 10 Ted Ashley flew to Israel to 
champion his project personally and to argue the case for an exclusive deal.27 Ashley 
met Premier Rabin, Defense Minister Shimon Peres and Minister for Commerce and 
Industry Haim Bar-Lev, a former chief-of-staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
                                                           
24 Simcha Dinitz to Director General (MFA), Telegram no. 79, July 5, 1976, 
HZ/1659/11, ISA.  
25 Washington Embassy to MFA (Jerusalem), Telegram no. 201, July 9, 1976; Simcha 
Dinitz to MFA (Jerusalem), Telegram no. 95, July 6, 1976, HZ/1659/11, ISA. 
26 "Israeli Raid In Uganda Spawns Two Pic Projects", Variety, July 7, 1976, 1; 
Undated and untitled table of companies interested in production, HZ/1659/11, ISA. 
27 Ted Ashley to Zohar Bar-Am, July 12, 1976, HZ/1659/11, ISA. 
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whose ministry was responsible for all state support for film production.28 A few days 
later, Barry Diller, the chairman of Paramount, telephoned Israel's United Nations 
ambassador, Chaim Herzog, with news that he had just signed contracts for an 
Entebbe project with the acclaimed director Sidney Lumet and celebrated scriptwriter 
Paddy Chayefsky (a well-known supporter of Israel); Diller also expressed concerns 
about Ted Ashley's attempts to get exclusivity.29 Paramount's president, David Picker, 
was soon also on his way to meet with Bar-Lev.30 Otto Preminger visited Israel to 
promote his own Entebbe project, which United Artists would distribute.31 
Yet another company pleading its case to the Israeli authorities was the 
independent studio First Artists, which was co-owned by a number of Hollywood 
stars, including the prominent pro-Zionists Paul Newman and Barbra Streisand. On 
July 7, the Israeli cultural attaché in Los Angeles, Haim Hefer, met with First Artists’ 
president Philip Feldman. In his report to his superiors at the MFA afterwards, Hefer 
described Feldman as “a sensitive and enthusiastic Jew” who felt “this was the big 
chance for him to do a film for Israel.” Hefer added that both Feldman and his stars 
                                                           
28 Hanan Bar-On to Director General (MFA), telegram no. 176, July 8, 1976, 
HZ/1659/11; Ezra Sassoon to the Minister (Bar-Lev), July 3, 1976, GL/21187/17, 
ISA. A picture of Ashley discussing his project in Bar-Lev's office appeared 
prominently in the Israeli press. See Davar, July 14, 1976, 2. 
29 New York to MFA, telegram no. 460, July 13, 1976, HZ/1659/11, ISA. 
30 Army Archerd, "Just for Variety", Variety, August 10, 1976, 2; Undated and 
untitled table of companies interested in production, HZ/1659/11, ISA. 
31 Maariv, August 4, 1976, 25; Undated and untitled table of companies interested in 
production, HZ/1659/11, ISA.  
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were prepared to forget all “commercial considerations” and to make an “ideological” 
film without unnecessary “fireworks” that “would show our moral and human side in 
the correct light.” In Hefer's presence, Feldman telephoned Paul Newman, who 
agreed “on the spot” to appear in his film. Barbra Streisand could also be relied on to 
take part if a proper script was produced, Feldman claimed, and he was awaiting 
answers from another two A-list actors, Dustin Hoffman and Steve McQueen.32 
Not every Hollywood Entebbe project seems to have crossed the Israeli 
government’s radar during this period. For example, one of the then rising stars of 
Hollywood, actor and producer Michael Douglas (a keen Israeli supporter like his 
father, Kirk), commissioned an Entebbe script from the novelist Don Carpenter. The 
script contained fictitious scenes showing the hijackers torturing their captives and an 
American hostage who, after being released in late July, plays a vital role in helping 
the Israeli commandos plan their raid.33 Even the veteran director Lewis Milestone, 
who had won an Academy Award for the classic anti-war drama All Quiet on the 
Western Front in 1930, got in on the Entebbe act. Milestone’s short treatment 
depicted Idi Amin as the terrorists’ crazed, “syphilitic” mastermind—“a cross 
                                                           
32 Haim Hefer (Los Angeles) to MFA, telegram no. 17, July 7, 1976, HZ/1659/11, 
ISA. 
33 Don Carpenter, “From These Lions,” August 1976, f. 5-6, box 4, Michael Douglas 
Papers, Wisconsin Center for Film and Theatre Research, Madison, WI. See also 
outline for a two-hour TV movie by James E. Colaneri, “Revenge for Entebbe,” 
January 14, 1977, f. 14, box 27, Michael Douglas Papers. 
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between Herman Goering and Henry VIII”—and reveled in the technicalities of the 
Israelis’ rescue operation.34 
Altogether, remarkably, upwards of seventeen American companies made 
efforts to produce an Entebbe movie in the summer of 1976. Almost all of the 
companies were owned or run by Jews; some collaborated with Israeli writers and 
filmmakers. All companies promised the cooperation of the preeminent film crews 
and stars in the business. One particular company, Merv Griffin Productions, assumed 
it had the inside track on the race for Entebbe—and for good reason: its president, 
Murray Schwartz, had actually been one of the hostages at Entebbe.35 
The Israeli authorities were determined to turn Entebbe into a filmic 
propaganda coup and therefore eager to take maximum political advantage of the 
interest that Hollywood, the world’s entertainment capital, was taking in the raid. 
However, officials were so spoiled for choice that at first a dispute arose over which 
Hollywood studio to back. On Ambassador Dinitz’s recommendation, the MFA’s 
heads had given an early nod of approval to Ted Ashley’s Warner Bros. Immediately 
after learning of Universal's approach and of Haim Hefer's dealings with First Artists, 
however, the MFA asked Dinitz to intervene “urgently” to prevent “entanglements 
and embarrassments.”36 Dinitz reacted to this by pulling rank and telling his cultural 
attaché in Los Angeles that the government had given Ashley’s project a “green 
light.” Hefer was infuriated by this, complained about the Washington embassy’s 
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constant meddling in his Hollywood territory, and threatened to resign.37 Hefer was 
himself a famous songwriter and his protest was sent directly to Foreign Minister 
Yigal Alon, an old friend, who instructed officials to put film matters back into his 
lap.38 At this early stage, the MFA told Israeli officials in the United States, Britain, 
France, and Canada to treat all filmmakers’ Entebbe proposals seriously but not to 
promise anything except that their details would be forwarded to the government in 
Jerusalem.39 
After this initial confusion, matters effectively passed into the hands of the 
Film Centre in the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry.40 After deliberation, 
the MCI decided it would support one major Entebbe production that promised to be 
realized as soon as possible, and issued a letter of auction to those companies 
expressing interest, with an end of July deadline. The MCI’s letter stated that the 
Israeli authorities would only provide one project with “authentic information within 
security limits,” as well as the use of “military equipment and personnel” and other 
institutional assistance. Interested companies had to supply details of their production 
(including how much of it would be filmed in Israel), a general outline of the script, 
and, “considering the political and military aspects of the event,” their “consent for 
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approval, by the proper authorities, of the final script and film.”41 In internal debates, 
the Israeli Defense Forces, whose cooperation all big Hollywood applicants sought for 
creative and commercial reasons, had already stipulated that the main criterion for its 
backing would be “how much the script helped to present the subject in accordance 
with the interests of the state of Israel.”42 According to press reports, Israel’s cabinet 
also briefly discussed the Entebbe film issue, with Prime Minister Rabin seeing merit 
in supporting a good film and hoping it might prove to be even more beneficial to 
Israeli national interests than Preminger’s Exodus. Haim Bar-Lev stipulated that the 
condition for government backing was that “we agree to the script.”43 
For their part, Israeli representatives in the United States made it abundantly 
clear to Hollywood bidders that Israeli co-operation depended on “a story that is not 
offensive to Israel or its population.”44 There seemed to be little danger of that, 
though, judging by the film treatments submitted by Hollywood's heavy-hitters. 
Universal Studios' Entebbe “concept,” for instance, which was based on director 
George Roy Hill and scriptwriter Loring Mandel’s own research in Israel, stated that 
for all their movie’s “high drama, adventure and suspense,” nothing was more 
important than its “moral content,” which would show that Israel was a “nation totally 
defined” by “each man's responsibility to his brother.” This was why Israel alone in 
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the world would not “capitulate to terrorism,” Hill and Mandel wrote, and why all 
hostages “must always” be brought home: including the dead embodiment of the 
Israeli ideal, Yoni Netanyahu, “American by birth, Israeli by choice.”45 
Warner Bros. submitted a concept which was equally high-minded. It vowed 
to “stress the parallel with earlier and deeply anguished moments in Jewish history,” 
epitomized in “the terrible Nazi-like ‘separation’ of the Israelis and Jews from the 
other hostages” at Entebbe. Israel's leaders and soldiers would be “portrayed as 
human beings, not killers” and “a clear contrast” established “between the character 
and goals of the Israelis and the vicious violation of international law by the 
terrorists.” Ted Ashley wrote personally of “our hope and intention that this film will 
cause people to better understand Israel's position in the world; its sense of restraint 
and yet its willingness and ability to fight for human values and for the integrity of its 
own country and people wherever the need exists.” Ashley summed up with the 
promise that these points would be made “totally clear even to the person sitting in the 
last row of the balcony of every theater in the world.”46 
Though more than a dozen companies had demonstrated an active interest in 
Entebbe throughout July, only five tendered fully-formed film “concepts” to the 
Israeli authorities by the end of the month.47 Asked by the government to review the 
proposals, the internationally-acclaimed Israeli film director Ephraim Kishon found 
no significant difference between them: all were basically “pro-Israeli.” Kishon saw 
                                                           
45 George Roy Hill and Loring Mandel “Concept” [undated], HZ/1659/11, ISA. 
46 Warner Bros., “Concept of the Film” [Undated], HZ/1659/11, ISA. 
47 Zohar Bar-Am to Shmuel Bunim and Efraim Kishon, August 1, 1976, 
GL/21187/17, ISA. 
21 
 
great political value in recruiting Universal or Warner Bros., but opted for the latter 
dependent on its promise to give the leading part of Brigadier Dan Shomron, 
commander of the Israeli raid, to Steve McQueen, one of Hollywood’s best-known 
tough guys and “a hero to hundreds of millions of cinema viewers around the 
world.”48 From Los Angeles, Haim Hefer and other Israeli representatives reported 
that all of the professionals whose advice they had sought recommended Universal's 
team of Hill and Mandel.49 However, Ted Ashley's personal involvement in Warner 
Bros.’ proposal—he even agreed to fly back to Israel at Bar-Lev’s request to hammer 
out last-minute details in late July—seems ultimately to have swayed the Israeli 
government’s final decision.50 
In mid-August 1976, five weeks after the Entebbe raid, the Israeli government 
announced that it had chosen Warner Bros. The government assured Warner Bros. 
exclusive assistance for one year, including provision of official information on the 
operation, the use of army units, and permission to rent military aircraft and vehicles. 
In return, Warner Bros. undertook to complete the film by the summer of 1977 with a 
budget of around $10 million. This was a mighty sum for the mid-1970s, higher, for 
instance, than Steven Spielberg’s 1975 blockbuster Jaws. Moreover, Warner Bros. 
promised to spend most of the $10 million in Israel itself and, significantly, to 
produce another six films in Israel over the next three years. The Israelis had earlier 
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tried to negotiate a share of the film’s profits too, but settled for Warner Bros. 
agreeing to donate an unspecified portion of the revenues to an Israeli soldiers' 
welfare fund.51 Warner Bros.’ film was to be directed by Franklin Schaffner, who 
several years earlier had made the multi-award-winning World War II movie Patton. 
The writer was to be Ken Ross, whose work included The Odessa File (1974), a 
thriller about neo-Nazis in West Germany, and the soon-to-be released Black Sunday 
(1977), in which an Israeli agent thwarts plans for mass murder at the U.S. Super 
Bowl by the Palestinian group Black September.52 Press reports stated that the IDF 
would appoint a brigadier-general as adviser to Warner Bros. and that the studio 
would also employ the services of Ilan Hartuv, one of the hostages at Entebbe and the 
son of Dora Bloch. Years earlier, Hartuv had been Israeli government liaison on both 
Leon Uris' and Otto Preminger’s Exodus projects.53 
Warner Bros. might have worked hard to “win” the Entebbe auction but its 
agreement with the Israeli government began to unravel almost as soon as it had been 
signed. First, Israeli hopes that Steve McQueen would star as the Entebbe operation's 
commander were quickly dashed. This was due to Ted Ashley’s unwillingness to 
meet the actor’s financial demands and McQueen's principal commitment to First 
                                                           
51 Yediot Achronot, August 13, 1976.  
52 Black Sunday, directed by John Frankenheimer, was the first prominent Hollywood 
disaster spectacle that was also explicitly and emphatically about terrorism. It was 
also the first feature film to display Palestinian terrorists on American soil. Prince, 
Firestorm, 25; Jack Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People 
(New York, 2009), 115. 
53 Yediot Achronot, August 23, 1976; Goodman, “Operation Exodus,” 213, 216–21. 
23 
 
Artists’ Entebbe project.54 Following this, news spread that an American television 
company was close to completing its own Entebbe movie. In mid-July, NBC 
Television, Twentieth Century Fox and producer Edgar J. Scherick jointly announced 
their intention of making a three-hour dramatized reconstruction of the Entebbe raid 
that would be ready for airing on American television in December. Later in July, 
Scherick presented this project to the Israeli consulate in New York, promising a film 
that would convey the global threat of terrorism and asking for Israeli technical 
support, but also stressing that his production—to be filmed mostly in California—
would go ahead even without Israeli assistance.55 In early October, Scherick’s 
production, titled Raid on Entebbe, commenced shooting under the direction of Irwin 
Kershner. Its stars included Peter Finch as Yitzhak Rabin and the popular action-man 
Charles Bronson as Brigadier Dan Shomron. The $5 million budget, including $1 
million for Bronson, was exceptionally large for a television drama.56 Twentieth 
Century Fox agreed to distribute Raid on Entebbe in cinemas overseas.57 
The prospect of getting spiked by a small-screen rival that was saving time 
and money by filming in California, combined with the spiraling costs of Warner 
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Bros.’ Entebbe production, seems to have knocked the wind out of Ted Ashley’s 
sails.58 The upshot is that in mid-October, following a round of difficult meetings in 
Israel with Haim Bar-Lev, Ashley announced that Warner Bros. was abandoning its 
Entebbe project on the grounds that the Israeli government had failed to provide all 
the agreed information on the raid and the cheap-to-hire material. Many working in 
Israeli public diplomacy and the Israeli film industry immediately saw this 
cancellation - after so much promise - as a  major blow. Local Israeli critics had 
argued all along that it was a mistake for the government to have given exclusivity to 
one Hollywood company. Others claimed Israel’s cumbersome bureaucracy had been 
to blame. When the matter was discussed  in an Israeli Cabinet meeting, Bar-Lev 
refuted Warner Bros.’ charges of Israeli foot-dragging over secret details of the 
Entebbe raid and argued that Ashley had reneged on the deal for purely financial 
reasons.59  
 A few weeks later, Bar-Lev's claims were largely vindicated, after Warner 
Bros. surprisingly announced that it had acquired the overseas cinematic distribution 
rights to Victory at Entebbe, another telemovie about Entebbe being made by David 
Wolper Productions for ABC Television. Marvin J. Chomsky was directing Victory at 
Entebbe and the project boasted an even bigger cast of stars than Raid on Entebbe, 
including Anthony Hopkins as Yitzhak Rabin and Elizabeth Taylor and Kirk Douglas 
as the distraught parents of a teenage Israeli hostage. Crucially, Victory at Entebbe 
was not being made on film but on videotape, which allowed for swift editing and 
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meant that Wolper’s movie would in all likelihood be the first Entebbe production to 
appear on screen.60  
Back in July, David Wolper - who had made a pro-Israeli documentary in the 
mid-1960s - had in fact informed the Israeli government of his plans for an Entebbe 
telemovie and of his "abiding interest to continue his commitment to the Israeli 
cause."61 Defense Minister Shimon Peres helped his scriptwriter, Ernest Kinoy, on a 
research trip to Israel in August, furnishing him with official publicity documents, 
such as an IDF history of Palestinian hijackings, and facilitating access to a dozen 
hostages, including Ilan Hartuv. (Separately, Kinoy also spoke with a number of 
young leftist Arabs in order to get a profile of the hijackers.)62 On ABC’s instructions, 
Wolper’s production had subsequently been shrouded in secrecy, but Ted Ashley had 
known about it since July and behind the scenes, in September, Warner Bros. had 
                                                           
60 Charles Fox interview, “Archive of American Television,” undated, 
http://www.emmytvlegends.org/interviews/shows/victory-at-entebbe, last accessed 
May 22, 2017. 
61 Robert Guenette to "Ezra Sason", July 28, 1976; Irwin Russell to Ezra Sassoon, 
July 27, 1976, GL/21187/14, ISA. 
62 See Victory at Entebbe: Publicity (General), f.24, box 214; Story Notes, f. 4, box 
214; Press Conferences, f. 22, box 214; Israeli Prime Minister (Historical Consulting), 
f. 19, box 214 all found at the Wolper Collection, USC.  
26 
 
actually bought Wolper Productions.63 Naturally, when news of Ashley’s new 
Entebbe deal finally broke, the Israeli government felt it had been tricked.64 
 As a direct result of the breakdown of the Israeli-Warner Bros. agreement, in 
November 1976, the two-horse American race to the screen between NBC and ABC 
was joined by Israel’s leading producer Menachem Golan.65 Golan announced that he 
would make Operation Thunderbolt—named after the code word for the Israeli raid—
with the full cooperation of the Israeli government on a $1.3 million budget. This was 
an exceptional sum for an Israeli film, about a third of which came from Irving Levin 
and Samuel Schulman, two Jewish-American businessmen with film and sporting 
portfolios whose own Entebbe project had earlier been rejected by the Israeli Ministry 
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of Commerce and Industry.66 Golan, an intense patriot who compared filmmaking 
with going to war and who believed only an Israeli film company could do justice to 
the Entebbe story, did everything he could to steal a march on the Americans, 
including putting all of his company’s other projects on hold and setting himself a 90-
day deadline.67 He enlisted Israel's leading film and theatre actors as well as a 
Hollywood screenwriter, Clarke Reynolds, who, like the rest of the cast and crew, 
worked around the clock to get the film ready for distribution by mid-January 1977. 
Golan knew he was a late entry; he and his cousin-partner Yoram Globus launched an 
audaciously publicity blitz in Hollywood: “The Israelis did it” and the Israelis would 
“tell it best.” Operation Thunderbolt would be a full-fledged motion picture—not a 
“TV show” or “videotape.” Israeli ministers, elite troops, and around a dozen hostages 
portraying themselves on screen would reinforce the film’s realism.68 
As anticipated, Victory at Entebbe eventually won the race to screen an 
Entebbe film. The film aired during primetime in the United States on ABC 
Television on the evening of December 13, 1976, watched by some 41 million 
viewers. As arranged, Warner Bros. then began distributing Victory in cinema theatres 
outside the United States. NBC's Raid on Entebbe aired on the evening of January 9, 
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1977, immediately after live coverage of that year’s Super Bowl game, and was 
watched by sixty million viewers (46% of the available audience).69 Having already 
been distributed by Twentieth Century Fox in Britain and France, Raid then travelled 
further afield. Golan and Globus' Operation Thunderbolt was first screened 
commercially in South Africa in February 1977. In the following month, special gala 
“guest-screenings” at the Israeli Consulate in New York and in Tel Aviv attracted 
numerous American and Israeli politicians, dignitaries and celebrities, with Yitzhak 
Rabin present at both events. Operation Thunderbolt predictably did well on Israeli 
cinema screens in the spring of 1977. Golan's company then distributed it quite 
successfully overseas.70 
Israeli officials may have been angered by Ted Ashley’s machinations and 
disappointed not to have a bone-fide Hollywood blockbuster about Entebbe on the big 
screen. The experience taught them an important lesson: that for all their pro-Israeli 
sympathies, Hollywood executives like Ashley thought above all of the bottom line. 
What is equally important, however, is that in many ways this falling-out probably did 
not matter. Such was the close, informal nature of the Hollywood-Israel relationship 
that Hollywood’s on-screen contribution to the Entebbe story fit the Israeli 
government’s requirements just about perfectly. 
Production records show that many of those involved in making all three 
Entebbe films were committed pro-Zionists determined to present Israel as a leader in 
the West’s fight against Arab-cum-international terrorism: an early promotion of the 
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theme of "partners against terror," which, as Mearsheimer and Walt point out, became 
a backbone of the pro-Israel rationale in the United States.71 Raid on Entebbe might 
have been directed by Irvin Kershner, who would go on to make the Star Wars sequel 
The Empire Strikes Back in 1980, but it was his fellow Jewish American, producer 
Edgar J. Scherick, who played the more creative role in the Entebbe film. Working on 
Raid on Entebbe energized Scherick’s support for Israel and he later spoke of it as 
being one of the most emotional, gratifying moments of his illustrious career.72 Peter 
Finch, whose role as Yitzhak Rabin in Raid earned him an Emmy nomination and was 
his last screen performance, had been an admirer of Israel since playing a Jewish 
paramilitary commander in the Palestine Mandate in Paramount’s Judith in 1966. In 
one of his last interviews, a few days before he died in January 1977, the English-
born, Australian Finch described Israel as “a real short-sleeve democracy, an 
aggressive one. There's comradeship and no saluting. Somehow the leaders haven't 
the facade our politicians have.”73  
Both the chief financier of Victory at Entebbe, ABC’s president Leonard 
Goldenson, and its creative overseer, David Wolper, were long-time friends of Israel. 
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Goldenson’s business and political mentor had been the aforementioned Barney 
Balaban.74 Wolper had made the seminal pro-Zionist TV documentary Let My People 
Go: The Story of Israel in 1965.75 Elizabeth Taylor had been a public advocate of 
Israeli causes since marrying the actor Eddie Fisher and converting to Judaism in 
1959.76 Praising her commitment to Israel some months after Entebbe, Simcha Dinitz 
told a Los Angeles fund-raising audience that during the crisis Taylor had offered to 
take the place of the Israeli hostages.77 Kirk Douglas, her on-screen husband, virtually 
begged David Wolper for the part of Yitzhak Rabin (whom he knew) so he could best 
build on his other pro-Israeli films The Juggler (1953) and Cast a Giant Shadow 
(1965); Douglas also offered Wolper copious advice on the script.78 Not all 
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Hollywood’s Jewish talent had such ideological devotion. One of Hollywood's 
leading young film stars, Richard Dreyfuss, who played Yonatan Netanyahu in 
Victory at Entebbe, was paid $250,000 for five days’ work. “I have no excuses,” he 
candidly told the press a few months later, “I did it for the money.”79 
There are some significant differences between the three Entebbe films. 
Operation Thunderbolt, for instance, pays much greater attention to the logistics of 
the Israeli military’s raid than the two American movies. In doing so, Operation 
Thunderbolt offers a more compelling, insider’s account of Israeli ingenuity and 
ruthlessness. As its title indicates, Victory at Entebbe is more overtly propagandistic 
than Raid—“its chronic Zionist overlay may be too strong for some stomachs,” one 
critic wrote—and the film is marred by unstable colors and hygienic sets.80 Raid 
appears more authentic than Victory owing to its use of film (rather than videotape) 
and outdoor locations. Victory is the most glamorous and melodramatic of the three 
movies and, to the chagrin of some reviewers, even introduces a tale of young love 
between two of the hostages.81 Raid and Operation Thunderbolt never bother to 
penetrate the real motives of the hijackers, but, unlike Victory, they do at least allow 
them a range of attitudes towards their hostages. Finally, Victory is the only film to 
criticize U.S. policy towards Israel, suggesting in a fractious Israeli cabinet scene that 
Washington has been denying its ally arms and trade deals owing to its opposition to 
Jewish settlements on the West Bank. 
                                                           
79 Fiona Lewish, “Richard Dreyfus: Persona Grata,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 
1977. 
80 Derek Elley, “Raid on Entebbe,” Films and Filming, March 1977, 42.  
81 Louise Sweet, ‘Victory at Entebbe’, Monthly Film Bulletin, Jan 1, 1977, 32–33. 
32 
 
Fundamentally, however, all three films are remarkably similar in terms of 
plot, viewpoint, style, political message, and even dialogue. Each purports to tell the 
truth, to give audiences a detailed but easily comprehendible, documentary-like 
outline of the Entebbe crisis. Each looks at the Entebbe crisis from the Israeli 
standpoint. Like most action/combat movies, each film focuses solely on the crisis 
itself (the hijacking and subsequent rescue mission) rather than on its background or 
causes. Each film gives ample screen time to violence: justified and heroic when 
perpetrated by the Israelis, unwarranted and cowardly when committed by the 
hijackers. And each tends of course to frame the Arab-Israeli conflict as a binary 
struggle between good and evil. Put together, the three films are highly 
complementary, underlining the way the American and Israeli news media had framed 
the Entebbe crisis in June–July 1976.82 
Much of what the three Entebbe films depicted, sometimes in fine detail, was 
factually correct. For instance, the Palestinian and German hijackers really had taken 
advantage of lax security at Athens Airport to smuggle weapons aboard Air France 
Flight 139 in boxes of candy. But the Entebbe films also incorporated elements of 
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artistic license, several of which either painted the Israelis in a more heroic light or 
served to further demonize the hijackers. Three stand out in particular. First, though 
each of the three films contains scenes in which the Israeli cabinet debates whether it 
should negotiate with the hijackers, Victory and Raid gloss over the fact that at a 
critical stage in the Entebbe crisis, when a military option appeared impossible, Israeli 
ministers had agreed to exchange the hostages for Palestinians held in Israeli jails. At 
the time, Yitzhak Rabin stated explicitly that this was not meant as a tactical ruse to 
gain time but based on his and others’ strong belief that, faced with such ultimatums, 
the cabinet would make a trade. Even the ultra-hawkish Menachem Begin, leader of 
the Opposition, acceded to this decision. Showing this willingness to trade would 
undoubtedly have weakened the movies’ tone of belligerence. It would also have 
contradicted the Israeli (and U.S.) governments’ public axiom that they would not 
negotiate with terrorists.83 
Second, all of the films focus significantly on Yonatan Netanyahu, portraying 
him as a flawless, tragic hero and the charismatic leader of a group of citizen-soldiers 
whose perfectionism makes them a lethal anti-terrorist force. In Raid and Victory 
especially, “Yoni” comes across as a flagbearer for Western humanistic tradition: a 
democratically-minded, poetry-reading reluctant warrior. In contrast, his foes, the sad 
or sadistic hijackers, suffer from misplaced idealism. Raid in particular highlights 
Netanyahu's real-life American connections - his Harvard University education, for 
instance, and his father’s job as a professor at Cornell University. Raid and Victory 
also emphasize Netanyahu’s Jewish background; for example, Edgar Scherick chose 
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Stephen Macht to play Yoni in Raid partly because he did not look “too Goyish.”84 
Here, Hollywood leant weight to others in US media and political circles who had 
quickly adopted Netanyahu as a model for modern-day, post-Vietnam War soldiering 
and who, like his younger brother and future Israeli premier Benjamin, saw him as a 
powerful symbol around which the cause of western counter-terrorism could be 
mobilized. In June 1977, former US president Gerald Ford was the first recipient of 
the annual Yoni Netanyahu Memorial Award from the American Friends of the 
University of Jerusalem for his friendship to Israel and his work in the “advancement 
of human values.” 85 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, all of the films reinforce Israel’s moral 
right to use whatever means it deems necessary to combat its enemies. Each of the 
movies does this principally via a lengthy, moving scene showing the hijackers at 
Entebbe putting the Jewish hostages in a smaller, separate room from the others. This 
reminds many of the hostages, especially those who were Holocaust survivors, of the 
notorious selektzia process that had doomed Jews to the gas chambers at Auschwitz. 
We see the hijackers pushing children and the elderly into their cramped new 
quarters; hear violins play sorrowfully; and look into the eyes of the terrified, lined up 
hostages. In reality, at Entebbe the hijackers had created an “Israeli room” for the 
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holders of Israeli passports. Though a few non-Israeli Jews ended up in the smaller 
room, many non-Israeli Jews remained in the original, larger room and most of the 
hostages released early had also been Jewish. (These included Hollywood producer 
Murray Schwartz). Immediately after the crisis, Israeli politicians and the Western 
media treated reports of the Nazi-style anti-Semitic selection at Entebbe as fact. Some 
West European left-wing radicals cut their ties with the Palestinian movement as a 
result.86 
Given the international news media’s saturation coverage of the real-life 
Entebbe crisis in June–July 1976, it seems safe to assume that many people simply 
were not interested in watching a rehashed, dramatized version of it many months 
later. Equally, so rare was it for three films to compete for viewers’ attention in this 
way, many people not normally taken with action movies must have been drawn to 
them. Either way, it is apparent from the viewing figures of Victory at Entebbe and 
Raid on Entebbe how wide an impact the three films had. It is also clear from other 
sources how deep an impact the films potentially had on viewers. 
David Wolper received several letters from American Jews congratulating and 
thanking him for his “excellent” work on Victory at Entebbe. One of these came from 
Harry Levin, the Dean of Arts and Sciences at Cornell University, where Yonatan 
Netanyahu’s father worked. Levin told Wolper that Cornell had just set up the 
Colonel Yonatan Netanyahu Memorial Fund for Jewish Studies, and invited the 
producer and cast of Victory to become members of the national committee 
responsible for nurturing the fund. In contrast, Wolper heard from other American 
Jews dismayed by what they saw as his film’s failure to spell out just how inventive 
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and courageous the Israeli raid had been. A property manager at Los Angeles real 
estate firm J. K. Eichenbaum Associates went further, arguing that by having Anthony 
Hopkins’ Yitzhak Rabin admit to Israel having been “lucky,” Victory encouraged 
rather than deterred further acts of terrorism. “All we can hope for now,” the property 
manager complained in a letter to Wolper, “is that the next picture will do a better job 
for Israel than yours.” This was an important reminder (for filmmakers and public 
diplomacy practitioners alike) of viewers’ ability to interpret movies in a variety of 
ways.87 
From a critical perspective, Victory at Entebbe was the clear loser. Many 
journalists thought Victory was long-winded, cliché-ridden, and cheap-looking (“the 
airport looks like papier-maché,” wrote Kay Gardella in the New York Daily News). 
Some felt that its stellar cast was more of a handicap than an asset, weighing the 
whole film down. One British commentator, Richard Combs, disliked how Victory 
“played unashamedly on the specter of the concentration camps.”88 Raid on Entebbe 
attracted plaudits for having a better script, for being more understated and for being 
more accurate than Victory—for showing the female terrorist’s acne scars, for 
instance. Raid was nominated for a total of ten Emmy Awards (winning two) and won 
a Golden Globe, an accolade bestowed by Hollywood’s powerful Foreign Press 
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Association, for best telefilm.89 Commentators in the United States, Israel, and 
elsewhere generally found Operation Thunderbolt to be the most convincing and 
realistic of the three Entebbe films, partly because it was less polished but mainly 
because it was a more “poignant” Israeli production. The Los Angeles Times called 
Thunderbolt “a stirring display of triumphant heroism at a time when people 
everywhere are overcome with a sense of futility at the escalating terrorism in today’s 
world.” Some audiences in France reportedly cheered when the hijackers were killed 
at the film’s climax.90 
Israeli public diplomacy officials and pro-Zionist groups in the United States 
sometimes worked in unison to promote Operation Thunderbolt. Immediately after 
one gala showing in Los Angeles in June 1977, for instance, organizers of an event 
sponsored by the State of Israel Bonds invited paying guests to a supper party with 
General Dan Shomron. At the party, Irving Levin and Samuel Schulman, who had 
helped finance Thunderbolt’s production costs, received a specially minted Entebbe 
Medal.91 Thunderbolt toured U.S. cities, including New York where it received 
powerful backing from the Israeli delegation to the United Nations and where it 
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helped raise funds for American Zionist organizations. In late 1977, Operation 
Thunderbolt became the fifth Israeli film (starting with Sallah Shabati in 1964) to be 
nominated for the Academy Award for Best Foreign Film. The film was 
commercially released in the United States in 1978, and was still doing well in cities 
like Miami at the end of that year.92 
The more acclaim (or opprobrium) the Entebbe films received, the greater 
political attention and controversy they often generated. Owing to the growing belief 
in the 1970s that international terrorism exploited the mass media’s appetite for 
spectacular violence, terrorist-centered movies inevitably came under the political 
spotlight. Films about the Arab-Israeli conflict attracted particular interest, not least 
because of that conflict’s global ramifications.93 Raid on Entebbe and Operation 
Thunderbolt were banned by the Department of Foreign Affairs in the Philippines on 
the grounds that their content was “inimical to the interests of the Arab countries.”94 
In West Germany, where the Entebbe crisis had been a major political issue due to the 
part played by the two Revolutionary Cells members, left-wing groups branded 
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Victory at Entebbe “pro-Zionist propaganda” and denounced its “openly pro-Zionist 
Hollywood actors” for stirring up hatred against the Palestinian people. Revolutionary 
Cells members attempted to firebomb two cinemas showing Victory in Dusseldorf and 
Aachen, and excoriated the film for connecting Entebbe to the Holocaust via its 
emphasis on the hijackers being German and the Jewish passengers having been 
“selected.” Scholar Tobias Ebbrecht-Hartmann argues that this reaction to Victory at 
Entebbe signaled the first time that the question of left-wing anti-Semitism entered 
public discourse in West Germany and that when, famously, the seminal NBC 
television series Holocaust (directed, too, by Marvin J. Chomsky) aired in West 
Germany in 1979, leftists linked that series to Victory at Entebbe.95 
The Israeli MFA closely monitored the international distribution and screening 
of all three Entebbe films. In early 1977, Israeli embassies and consulates reported 
that Arab governments had lobbied successfully for the banning of the Hollywood 
films in places as far and wide as Thailand and Malta.96 The MFA followed the 
bombing and arson of cinemas by pro-Palestinian supporters, not just in West 
Germany but also in Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Argentina, Columbia, and 
Trinidad. The Israeli consulate in New York turned this violence to its advantage by 
stimulating American media editorials that presented the attacks as threats to 
"freedom of expression" and as evidence of the spreading of "extortion and terrorism" 
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into the arts.97 The consulate conveyed this theme and information to the New York 
correspondent of the entertainment trade journal Variety, who soon penned an article 
on the subject headlined "censorship by terror".98 
By themselves, the three Entebbe films that emerged in 1976-1977 did not of 
course change the shape or direction of U.S.-Israeli relations. Neither did the films, 
alone, alter the contours of the relationship between Hollywood and Israel. A wide 
range of people, institutions and forces had slowly but surely sculpted these contours 
over three decades. Collectively, the Entebbe movies probably did not even come 
close to Otto Preminger’s Exodus in “selling” Israel in the United States either, for all 
Yitzhak Rabin’s hopes. Nonetheless, the films added real flesh to Israel’s image in the 
United States as both a heroic underdog and Washington’s key strategic partner in the 
Middle East. They helped convert powerful Hollywood producers like Edgar J. 
Scherick into firm friends of the Israeli state. They strengthened links between some 
senior American and Israeli film producers, and, in the shape of Operation 
Thunderbolt, they demonstrated that Israelis could create impressive, money-making 
movies. 
Operation Thunderbolt turned out, in fact, to be a landmark film. It brought 
Israeli cinema to international commercial regard and it also led Menachem Golan to 
move to Hollywood. From this new, more powerful base, Golan helped lead the 
                                                           
97 Azaria Rapoport to MFA (Jerusalem), Telegram no. 268, February 9, 1977; 
Telegram no. 487, February 20, 1977, HZ/1659/10; MFA to New York, Telegram no. 
604, February 22, 1977, ISA. 
98 Robert J. Landry, "Mild & Rabid Protests Against 'Entebbe': Instance of 
'Censorship by Terror'," Variety, 2 March 1976, 7. 
41 
 
American film industry’s full-frontal assault on “Arab terrorism” in the 1980s and 
1990s. Several of his movies showed Israelis and Americans ruthlessly teaming up to 
defeat their common enemy. The most successful, The Delta Force (1986), in effect 
re-booted Entebbe for a new audience by celebrating U.S. commandos rescuing 
Jewish-American aircraft hostages held by crazed, anti-Semitic Islamists in Beirut. 
“You guys have done it before,” an excited American colonel in the movie (played by 
Lee Marvin) tells his Israeli colleagues when planning the mission, “Now it’s our 
turn.”99 
 
What is the wider importance for historians of American foreign affairs of this case 
study of Hollywood-Israeli relations set around the famous Entebbe raid of July 1976? 
First, it provides a clear illustration of the value of marrying diplomatic and media 
history sources. In doing so, we have learned that throughout Hollywood’s history, 
contrary to what some might believe, the American government has not been alone in 
recruiting U.S. filmmakers for public diplomacy purposes.100 The article shows that 
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during the 1970s senior Israeli ministers and officials not only considered Hollywood 
to be a powerful image-builder but an Israeli asset due to friends in high places. We 
have also learned that, as a player in international affairs, Hollywood’s potential 
influence extends far beyond that which appears on screen. This points to the need to 
look further at Hollywood “actor-vism” during the Arab-Israeli conflict and to extend 
the recent work that scholars have done on the impact of celebrity activism generally 
on global politics.101  
 Second, this case study underlines the importance of factoring Hollywood into 
the history of the propaganda war fought over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather than 
focusing on the news media’s role in this war (important though that is), scholars need 
to take into account how the U.S. entertainment industry has framed Israel and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict over the past seventy years and how that framing might relate to 
the views on the conflict adopted by the American public and U.S. policymakers. By 
screening Entebbe in the way that it did, Hollywood powerfully demonstrated its 
ability to entertain and persuade by reducing complex political and diplomatic issues 
to black-and-white narratives. In many ways, the Entebbe raid was tailor-made for 
this crude formulation because it fitted the mold of the conventional Hollywood 
adventure movie, but it would be interesting to investigate (via the sorts of sources 
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used in this article) whether Hollywood has always tended to depict the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in these terms and what commercial, diplomatic, and political forces explain 
American popular culture’s approach to the conflict generally. Given that culture’s 
worldwide reach, the findings naturally have implications internationally as well as in 
the United States. 
 Finally, the case study tells us that we need to broaden the debate about the 
role that America’s pro-Israel community has played in the shaping of U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East. To date largely confined to formal lobbying in Washington, 
since the 1990s, this debate needs to be extended historically and to incorporate 
groups and individuals that have used their political, economic, or cultural weight to 
promote U.S.-Israeli relations unofficially and outside the Beltway. Hollywood, 
America’s entertainment as opposed to political capital, is a prime example of this. 
Having started cautiously in the late 1940s lest it faced charges of dual loyalty, the 
Jewish community in Hollywood had risen by the 1970s to be one of Israel’s strongest 
supporters. It had links in Washington and colleagues and friends in Jerusalem; it 
worked in assorted ways on and off screen to promote the U.S.-Israeli alliance. When 
Entebbe came along it allowed Hollywood’s pro-Israel community to crystalize its 
campaigning efforts, and to present Israelis as many of those within the community 
believed them to be—surrogate Americans. To studio heads like Ted Ashley, 
producers like David Wolper, and actors like Kirk Douglas, Hollywood played a 
uniquely powerful role within the U.S.-Israeli alliance. Given Hollywood’s 
formidable powers of persuasion, this in many ways made perfect sense. 
 
